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I.  Introduction 
 
Although Pakistan’s economy enjoyed relatively stable growth during the 1990s, poverty 
and income inequality continued to rise.
1 The most recent official estimates are that 
roughly one third of the population was below the poverty line at the start of the 
millennium (Government of Pakistan (2003), p. 12). In response to these widely cited 
figures, the Government of Pakistan established poverty reduction as its overarching 
objective and, recognizing the potential role of microfinance in alleviating poverty, 
embarked on a Microfinance Sector Development Program (MSDP) to broaden and 
deepen the microfinance sector to provide a broad range of financial services in a 
sustainable manner. 
 
The Khushhali Bank, a retail microfinance bank established in August 2000, was the first 
licensed microfinance bank established under the MSDP, and expectations for 
Khushhali as the flagship microfinance institution in Pakistan are high. The State Bank of 
Pakistan views Khushhali as a “model institution” for the private sector to follow in 
establishing sustainable, commercial microfinance banks that substantially increase the 
outreach of a range of financial services to the poor (State Bank of Pakistan (2004) p. 
19).  
 
Despite its short history, the bank has performed well by these criteria. It has quickly 
grown into by far the largest provider of microfinance in Pakistan, now providing a range 
of loan products to over 230,000 active clients from its network of branches across the 




But as its roots in the MSDP would suggest, in addition to the pressure to quickly expand 
outreach and make profits, Khushhali simultaneously faces the challenge of meeting a 
“second bottom line”: poverty reduction. The bank’s dual mission is reflected in its 
Annual Report, which alongside audited financial statements and indicators of financial 
performance such as the bank’s credit rating, portfolio at risk and efficiency ratio,
3 
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1 Real GDP growth fluctuated around 3% throughout the 1990s (Government of Pakistan (2003), p.21), but 
the head count index using the official poverty line, which is based on calorie consumption, rose from 26.1 in 
1990 91 to 32.1 in 2000 01 (Government of Pakistan (2003), p.12) and the Gini coefficient, which measures 
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includes a statement on the “Status and Nature of Business” emphasizing that the bank 
was 
 established to mobilize funds for providing micro finance services to 
poor persons, particularly poor women for mitigating poverty and 
promoting social welfare and economic justice through community 
building and social mobilization with the ultimate objective of poverty 
alleviation (Khushhali Bank Annual Report 2004). 
 
This study empirically addresses the question of whether the bank is also meeting these 
social objectives. As such, it fills an important niche in the literature on microfinance and 
has important implications for the microfinance sector, not only in Pakistan, but 
worldwide. Case studies on the role of microfinance in helping poor households to help 
themselves out of poverty have inspired microfinance practitioners around the globe and 
spawned the “microcredit revolution.”
4 But anecdotes showing the potential impact of 
microfinance are not a substitute for careful empirical studies, which report the typical 
impact of microfinance on large samples after controlling for various biases. As reported 
in earlier ADBI research, “although microfinance institutions are often seen by aid 
practitioners as a manifestly effective means of improving the position of the poor, 
detailed research studies have been much more guarded about their impact” 
(Montgomery and Weiss (2005)). To date, there have been only a handful of rigorous 
empirical impact studies that seriously address statistical issues such as bias. Given 
recent trends in the sector toward sustainable microfinance, this study is of particular 
interest. Khushhali is a retail microfinance bank focused on the core objectives of 
operational and financial self sufficiency, so this study can play a role in informing the 
policy debate on the feasibility of a “double bottom line” for microfinance institutions: 
pursing profitable, sustainable business practices in tandem with social objectives like 
poverty reduction and empowerment of the poor. 
   
II.  The Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 
 
Microfinance is still relatively new to Pakistan, both in concept and practice. Until 2000, 
the main providers of microfinance were NGOs
5 and government sponsored rural 
support networks
6 or, in at least one case, a traditional commercial bank with a 
specialized microfinance window. With the exception of KASHF, a well known NGO 
operating out of Lahore, none of these institutions are specialized microfinance 
institutions and none have demonstrated financial sustainability
7 (Pakistan Microfinance 
Network (2003)). Despite the achievements of these institutions,
8 the total outreach of all 
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these organizations is still less than 5% of the estimated 5.6 million poor households in 
Pakistan that require microfinance services (Pakistan Microfinance Network Website; 
see Figure 1 for details).  
 
<Insert Figure 1 Around Here> 
 
To reach these un served households, in 2001 the government of Pakistan established a 
regulatory framework to promote the rapid expansion of microfinance throughout the 
country. Learning from international experiences, in promoting the expansion of access 
to financial services, policymakers emphasized the importance of sustainable 
microfinance and encouraged private sector participation from the start (State Bank of 
Pakistan (2004), p.19). Legislation established a specialized microfinance banking 
license to provide microfinancial services on the district, region or nationwide level. 
Prudential regulation of the licensed microfinance banks is carried out by the State Bank 
of Pakistan, the central bank, as it is for other commercial banks operating in the country. 
As with other banks, microfinance banks are required to submit to an external audit and 
to publish an annual report. The first step of licensing has been to allow lending. The 
microfinance banks are allowed to offer voluntary savings services only after being in 
operation for some time and having an appropriate MIS system in place. Loans are 
allowed up to a maximum of Rs. 100,000 and clients in turn are allowed to borrow no 
more than a maximum of Rs. 100,000 in total from any combination of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs).
9 In addition to regulating the amount of lending, the legislation 
regulates the opening of new branches and provisioning, rescheduling and write off of 
loans, and to some extent interest rates since microfinance banks are required to 
implement “appropriate pricing policies which ensure access of affordable financial 
services to the poor as well as operational and financial self sustainability of MFIs”  
(State Bank of Pakistan (2004)). 
 
The effect of this legislation has been to dramatically increase the outreach of 
microfinance in Pakistan. Khushhali Bank, the flagship institution, now serves over 
230,000 active clients, more than the number of clients reached by all the NGOs and 
rural support programs in total before its establishment in 2000.
10 In addition to 
Khushhali Bank, there are now several other licensed microfinance banks
11 in Pakistan 
and others are in the process of applying.  
 
III.  Khushhali Bank Operations 
 
Khushhali Bank’s mandate is to serve the poor, defined as persons who have meager 
means of subsistence and whose total income or receipt during a year is less than the 
minimum taxable limit. Accordingly, Khushhali serves clients who are “poor” and “very 
poor,” but not those who are “destitute” (receiving zakat) or the “non poor,” who receive 
enough income to pay income tax. In the sample drawn for this study, more than 70% of 
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the clients were below the official poverty line of the Government of Pakistan,
12 and 20% 
again were at less than half of the caloric consumption defined as poor.  
 
Although the bank has introduced an individual scoring report to screen and classify 
clients according to the above criteria, it uses a group lending methodology under which 
clients form groups called community organizations that can be male, female or mixed 
gender groups of between three and 25 members (usually three to five members in 
urban and 10 25 in rural areas) who provide personal guarantees to each other. Loans 
are made directly to individuals in the group, but if one member of the group defaults 
then all members of that group become ineligible for loans.  
 
The bank offers eligible clients uncollateralized microloans of Pk.Rps. 3,000 – 30,000 
(approximately US$50 500). The first loan would be between Rupees 3,000 10,000 
(US$50 170) with loan sizes increasing 20% with each cycle to a maximum of Pk.Rps. 
30,000 (US$500). The terms of the microloan varies between 3 12 months, to be repaid 
with 20% interest on declining balances in equal monthly installments or in one bullet 
payment, depending on the purpose of the loan. Loans are offered for investments in 
agriculture (40% of the current loan portfolio), livestock (24%) or microenterprises (36%): 
to establish a new business or purchase assets or working capital for an existing 
business. In addition to the interest rate, clients are required to provide 10% of the loan 
size as mandatory savings or “financial collateral.” 
 
Most client groups are formed by the communities themselves with facilitation from 
Khushhali Bank staff, but some are groups facilitated by NGO groups such as Bunyaad 
Literacy Community Council (BLCC), Family Planning Association of Pakistan (FPAP), 
Health and Nutrition Development Society (HANDS), Human Development Foundation 
(HDF), Indus Resource Center (IRC) and Sindh Graduates Association (SGA). The 
costs of community mobilization through NGO service providers are provided through a 
separate fund – the Microfinance Social Development Fund – created for that purpose, 
so costs to the bank for mobilizing directly or through an NGO partner are neutral to the 
bank.  
 
In addition to loans, the bank has started offering equity sharing in small infrastructure 
projects to interested community organizations. These projects are undertaken on an 
80:20 cost sharing basis, with the community organizations covering 20% of the costs. 
Many of the projects are irrigation or water supply projects, but the requests from 
community organizations also include rural electrification, installation of street pavement, 
or the construction of community buildings such as schools or computer centers. These 
projects are financed out of a Community Investment Fund, which is administered by the 
State Bank of Pakistan.  
 
Both the Microfinance Social Development Fund and the Community Investment Fund 
will be available to the other newly established microfinance banks, so the effectiveness 
of these programs has significant implications for the sector as a whole. The small 
infrastructure project program was still in its pilot phase at the time the survey for this 
study was carried out, so that program is not assessed here, but the empirical results do 
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include an analysis of the differential impacts of lending to groups formed by NGO 
partners as opposed to groups formed by Khushhali Bank staff directly.  
 
Plans are also underway for the bank to begin offering voluntary savings accounts and 
distance learning training programs to build capacity among active and potential clients. 
These services have not yet been implemented and are not analyzed here.  
 
At the close of the last fiscal year (December 2004), Khushhali served 175,000 active 
clients in 64 districts throughout Pakistan. The bulk of the clients are in rural areas (60%) 
and roughly one third are women. Of them, 12% were in groups formed by NGO 
partners and approximately 5% were in groups that had also received a small 
infrastructure project in their community.  
 
IV.  Literature Review: The Impact of Microfinance 
 
A perfect impact evaluation really needs to answer a counterfactual question: how does 
the status of participants in the program compare with how those same individuals would 
have fared in the absence of the program? The problem with cross sections of data 
(observations on many individuals at a given point in time) is that at any given point in 
time, individuals are observed to be either participants or not. Even panels of data 
(observations on many individuals through time) are problematic since over time many 
other things have happened to the individuals in addition to program participation and it 
is nearly impossible to separate out the impact of the program from all the other 
influences. In reality, researchers must settle for estimates of the average impact of the 
program on a group of participants – the treatment group – compared to a credible 
comparison group – a control group. The ideal control group is individuals who would 
have had outcomes similar to those in the treatment group if the members of the 
treatment group had not participated in the program.  
 
But constructing a control group comparable to the treatment group is not 
straightforward. Participants in the program are usually different from non participants in 
many ways: programs are usually carefully placed in specific areas, participants within 
those areas may be screened for participation, and the final decision on whether or not 
to participate is usually voluntary. To the extent that these factors are known and can be 
measured, they can be controlled for in the empirical analysis, but in most cases the 
placement of the program and self selection of participants in those areas into the 
program are based on unobservable factors. These unobservable factors lead to at least 
two kinds of bias in any empirical impact evaluation: program placement bias and self 
selection bias. 
 
Controlling for this bias – determining the effects of microfinance alone and separating 
out the impact of microcredit from what would have happened to the same household 
without credit – is often the most difficult part of careful empirical impact studies. Well 
run microfinance institutions do not randomize either the location of their operations or 
their selection of clients. If MFIs tend to operate in areas that have relatively better or 
worse infrastructure such as access by roads or more or less active markets, then 
estimates of the impacts of the program on participants do not measure the effects just 
of microfinance, but of these other factors as well. Even within a given village, if, as 
studies by Coleman (2002), Alexander (2001) and Hashemi (1997) suggest, 
microfinance clients already have initial advantages over non clients, then the impact of 
microfinance will be overestimated if these initial biases are not controlled for. Similarly,   6
the impact of microfinance programs that deliberately target relatively disadvantaged 
households in the areas they operate may be underestimated if these biases are not 
controlled for.  
 
Despite the importance of thinking carefully about these issues, few studies have 
addressed them rigorously, and for good reason. As nicely summarized in an overview 
of the impact of microfinance on poverty and gender equity prepared for the Pakistan 
Microfinance Network (Hussein and Hussain (2003)) rigorous quantitative studies are 
costly and time consuming.
 13 Few MFIs have the resources in terms of funds or staff 
time to conduct them. There is a movement in the industry to create practitioner friendly 
assessment tools (e.g.: the Imp Act project based at the Institute of Development 
Studies at Sussex, USAIDs AIMS project and assessment tools by CGAP), but these 
assessments, while very useful to the institutions themselves in refining their targeting, 
products and marketing, are not rigorous quantitative measures of impact and do not 
adequately address the issues of selection bias.
14  
 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) provide a compelling argument in favor of 
making the substantial investment required to conduct careful impact studies that control 
for these potential biases: 
Unfortunately, this is not an esoteric concern that practitioners and 
policymakers can safely ignore. It is not just a difference between 
obtaining “very good” estimates of impacts versus “perfect” estimates – 
the biases can be large. In evaluating the Grameen Bank, for example, 
Signe Mary McKernan (2002) finds that not controlling for selection bias 
can lead to overestimation of the effect of participation on profits by as 
much as 100 percent. In other cases  controlling for these biases 
reverses conclusions about impacts entirely. 
There are a handful of studies that rigorously address the issues of selection bias and 
endogeneity. The approaches of Pitt and Khandker (1998), Hulme and Mosely (1996), 
Coleman (1999), and work in progress by Banerjee and Duflo are discussed below. 
 
A.  Exogenous Eligibility Requirement 
 
In an innovative approach to controlling for selection bias, Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
combine the use of a quasi natural experiment and eligibility requirements to study the 
impacts of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and 
Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). They sample 1538 participants and 260 
non participants in a number of “treatment” villages where group lending programs are 
operating as well as randomly selected households from “control” villages without a 
program. They use village fixed effects to correct for the endogeneity of program 
placement and take advantage of the fact that the microcredit programs impose eligibility 
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requirements on participants (households with land holdings of more than half an acre 
are ineligible) to determine eligible and ineligible households in the control villages. 
Impact is assessed using a difference in difference approach between eligible and 
ineligible households and between program and non program villages. After controlling 
for other factors, such as various household characteristics, any remaining difference is 
attributed to the microfinance programs.  
 
The study draws a number of conclusions, but the main one is that the program had a 
positive effect on household consumption, which was significantly greater for female 
borrowers. On average, a loan of 100 taka to a female borrower, after being repaid, 
allowed a net consumption increase of 18 taka. In terms of poverty impact it is estimated 
that 5% of participant households were pulled above the poverty line annually. 
 
The accuracy of the original results as presented in Pitt and Khandker (1998) has been 
disputed on the grounds that the eligibility criteria of low land holdings was not strictly 
enforced in practice. In a reworking of the results focusing on more directly comparable 
households, no impact on consumption from participation is found (Morduch 
(1999):1605). This debate, which in part centers around details of econometric 
estimation, has not been resolved. An unpublished paper by Pitt reworks the original 
analysis to address the concerns of Morduch and is said to confirm the original results 
(Khandker (2003), footnote 1). 
 
B.  Prospective Clients as a Control Group 
 
Another approach to controlling for self selection and placement bias, used by Hulme 
and Mosley (1996) and Coleman (1999), is to include a sample of microcredit clients 
who have formed solidarity groups but have not yet received loans as the control group. 
In this approach, participating and non participating households are again surveyed in 
treatment villages where the microcredit program is already operating and has already 
given loans. The control villages are villages where the microcredit program will operate 
and households from the village have already self selected to participate in the program 
but have not yet actually received loans. 
 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) employ this approach in their study of programs in a number 
of countries including the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(BRI). In general, a positive impact is found on borrower incomes of the poor with an on 
average increase over the control groups ranging from 10 12% in Indonesia, to around 
30% in Bangladesh and India. Gains are found to be larger for non poor borrowers, 
however, and within the poorest group, gains are negatively correlated with income.  
 
However, Hulme and Mosley’s study fails to control for the major source of bias – 
program placement bias – so part of the advantage of program participants relative to 
the control group may be due to unmeasured village attributes that affect both the supply 
and demand for credit.
15  
 
Coleman (1999) advances the literature by expanding on this concept to control for self 
selection bias and introducing both observable village characteristics and village fixed 
effects to control for program placement bias in his study of a village banking program in 
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Thailand. Utilizing data on 455 households, including participating and non participating 
households in treatment villages where a village bank is already offering microcredit, and 
selected future participants and non participants in control villages that have been 
identified to receive a village bank program but have not yet actually received funds, 
Coleman uses a difference in difference approach that compares the difference between 
income for participants and non participants in program villages with the same difference 
in the control villages, where the programs were introduced later.  
 
Coleman’s study measures the effects of access to rather than participation in a 
microcredit program and finds no evidence that months of access to a village bank 
program has an impact on any asset or income variable and no evidence that access to 
village bank loans increases productive activity. The author cautions, however, against 
extrapolating these results to other contexts since Thailand is a rather wealthy 
developing country. One of the reasons for the weak poverty impact is that there was a 
tendency for wealthier households to self select into village banks, and the relatively 
small sizes of loans may mean that they were largely used for consumption. 
 
This approach is not perfect either. Karlan (2001) points out that in application, it often 
fails to correct for possible attrition bias – the fact that the control group includes 
potential future dropouts (or graduates) of the program, whereas the treatment group of 
older borrowers (who have in fact remained active borrowers) does not. Depending on 
the reasons for attrition, attrition bias can be positive or negative. If it is due to successful 
clients “graduating” out of microfinance into the formal financial sector, then impact will 
be underestimated. If it is due to dropouts who find the program unhelpful or whose 
microenterprises fail, however, then impact will be overestimated. Armendáriz de Aghion 
and Morduch (2005) review a number of studies that find dropout rates between 3.5% 
60% per year in various microfinance programs worldwide. Even the lower end 
estimates can add up over time.
16   
 
C.  Randomized Program Design 
 
There are a few very recent impact studies underway that use a randomized study 
design to control for selection bias. Interested readers are referred to Duflo and Kremer 
(2003), who describe the use of this type of evaluation for an educational program in 
Mexico. (Banerjee and Duflo (in progress) will apply this approach to a microfinance 
impact assessment for the Center for Micro Finance Research (CMFR).) This approach 
eliminates selection bias by randomly selecting treatment (those who receive 
microfinance) and control (those who do not) groups from a potential population of 
participants. With this type of study design, the researcher can be assured that on 
average those who are exposed to the program are no different than those who are not, 
and thus that a statistically significant difference between the groups’ outcomes can be 
confidently attributed to the program rather than to selection bias. 
 
Well designed studies of this sort have the potential to rigorously address all kinds of 
potential biases, although they are limited by the fact that they can only estimate partial 
equilibrium treatment effects, which may differ from general equilibrium treatment effects. 
In the case of microfinance, this means that if, for example, microfinance is introduced 
on a large scale, the program can eventually affect the functioning of financial markets 
                                                 
16 Although it should be noted that these rates are still much lower than the rate of failure of newly-
established enterprises in developed countries such as the United States or Japan.    9
and thus have a different impact than the necessarily smaller scale program introduced 
for the impact study.  
 
A more practical concern in attempting to apply randomized study design is that such 
studies require tremendous cooperation from the institutions being evaluated, who must 
be willing to allow researchers to randomize the implementation of their services. Such 
studies must also be longitudinal, making them costly, and it can be difficult to conduct 
research over a time line long enough for some impacts to show up. In the case of 
Banerjee and Duflo’s study for CMFR, the time frame between base line and final study 
is one year, which may not be long enough for some of the impacts of microfinance to 
show up quantitatively. For these reasons randomized studies will likely continue to 
constitute a tiny fraction of all microfinance evaluations.  
 
V.  Research Methodology 
 
The nature of Khushhali Bank’s operations lent itself to an impact assessment using 
prospective clients who have not yet accessed loans as a comparison, or control group. 
The bank was rapidly expanding into new villages and the number of active clients was 
increasing at a rate of approximately 20,000 clients every three months. Bank 
management and staff were willing to cooperate with surveyors in identifying new 
villages that had just received the service and within those villages identifying new 
clients, allowing them to be surveyed in the interim between their application and the 
approval to get a microloan and the actual disbursement of the money.  
 
 
A.  Sample Selection
17 
 
Primary data was collected from 2,881 households – more than for any other 
rigorous impact study carried out to date. A stratified random sample of 1,454 Khushhali 
Bank clients and future clients was drawn from 139 rural villages and three urban cities 
where Khushhali operates. A roughly equal number (1,427) of randomly selected non 
clients from the same villages or settlements were also surveyed. The survey covered 
11 districts
18 from all five provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, NWFP and AJK) of 
Pakistan. The 11 districts were represented roughly evenly in the sample (see Figures 2 
and 3 for distribution of sample by province and district).  
 
<Insert Figures 2 and 3 Around Here> 
 
At the time the sample was drawn, Khushhali was operating in approximately 42 
districts in Pakistan and had about 175,000 active clients, 37,000 of which were in the 11 
districts finally sampled. Thus, the sample represented more than a quarter of the 
districts served by Khushhali, and about 4% of the clients in the selected districts, but 
less than 1% of the total number of clients at that time.  
                                                 
17 The author would like to thank Brett Coleman for discussions on sampling and  the application of the 
approach used in his 1999 study.  
18 Muzaffarabad  (AJK),  Dera  Ismali  Khan  (NWFP),  Kohat  (NWFP),  Lahore  (Punjab),  Dera  Ghazi  Khan 
(Punjab),  Rahimyar  Khan  (Punjab),  Karachi  (Sindh),  Jacobabad  (Sindh),  Nawabshah  (Sindh),  Quetta 
(Balochistan), Loralai (Balochistan). There is currently no truly urban lending in AJK, although Muzaffarabad 
includes some semi urban areas. Urban lending in NWFP was randomly selected as Kohat, which in fact 
has more urban Khushhali clients than Peshawar, the largest city in the province.   10
Half (794, or 54%) of the client households in the sample were female clients (the 
female head of household was a program member). A decision was taken to over 
represent females in the sample (roughly 30% of Khushhali clients are women) in order 
to yield more robust estimates of gender issues – an important policy question – in the 
empirical analysis.  
One quarter (732, or 25%) of the total sample, were from urban areas in Quetta, 
Karachi, Lahore, or urban areas served by Kohat branch. At the time of the sampling, 
roughly 35% of the surveyed areas population was urban clients and approximately 15% 
of the total population of clients at that time was from the urban areas included in the 
survey and four other urban cities (Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Sukkur and Hyderabad).  
Of the clients, 11% were from branches where NGO service providers had 
formed groups, which corresponds to the actual population of clients, 12% of whom were 
in groups formed by service provider partners at the time the sample was drawn.  
The sample of clients is unusual in that it included clients from not only active 
community organizations, but also groups that were in default, currently inactive for other 
reasons, or had completely dropped out of the program,
19 removing any possible source 
of attrition bias from the analysis.  
 
B.  Survey Design 
 
The design of the survey followed international guidelines, in particular those laid out in 
the three volume series by Grosh and Glewwe (2000) on the Living Standards and 
Measurement Survey (LSMS).  
 
i.  Survey Instrument – Questionnaire
20 
 
The design of the survey instrument, the questionnaire to be used in gathering data for 
the study, was primarily guided by the research question: what was the impact of the 
microfinance program on household welfare? It was decided to include a relatively wide 
definition of welfare that includes non economic measures of welfare such as education, 
health or empowerment.  
 
The core components of the LSMS were incorporated, and the final questionnaire also 
drew upon the AIMS SEEP Impact Survey Tools – impact assessment tools designed 
specifically for assessment of microfinance institutions – as well as several carefully 
designed questionnaires used in previous studies in Pakistan including the Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey (PIHS, round 3 of which was carried out in 1998 1999), the 
Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES, which was combined with the PIHS and 
last conducted in 2001 2002), the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) and the 
Pakistan Socio Economic Survey (PSES). The findings of a nationwide participatory 
                                                 
19 706 clients, or roughly half the treatment group, were currently  active. 13% were  inactive, 18% were 
members of a group where at least one in the group was in default, making all members ineligible to receive 
loans, and 16% had completely dropped out of the program.  
20 The author would like to thank GM Arif of ADB’s Pakistan Resident Mission, Tak Kurosaki of Hitotsubashi 
University and Yasu Sawada of Tokyo University for helpful discussions on the design of the questionnaire.    11
poverty assessment
21 (Government of Pakistan (2004)) were also consulted and the 
results of focus group discussions with Khushhali Bank clients were incorporated.
22   
 
The length of the questionnaire was limited to what could be reasonably delivered in a 
maximum of one hour if all components were asked. In the final administration, most 
questionnaires took substantially less than one hour since very few households would 
actually respond to all sections. The sequence of the questions was guided by the LSMS, 
and accordingly sensitive questions on finances or empowerment issues were 
administered last.  
 
To increase the accuracy of the information gathered and to enable the survey to 
address gender issues such as empowerment, both the male and female head of 
household were interviewed separately for each household. The suitability of different 
components of the questionnaire for the male or female version was decided based on 
the previous questionnaires listed above and confirmed in pre testing.  
 
The questionnaire was prepared simultaneously in English and Urdu and then translated 
into two regional languages: Pushto and Sindhi. The accuracy of the translations was 
checked by back translation into the original language.  
 
The survey was pre tested in late February 2005 in five districts on both client and non 
client households. The results of this pre test were then analyzed and discussed and 
some final revisions to the questionnaire or its administration were made. During pre 
testing, the length of the questionnaire was found to be too long and it was subsequently 
shortened. Two changes to the components of the male and female questionnaires were 
also made. Information on animal raising was moved from the female questionnaire to 
the male questionnaire because during the pre test surveyors found that although 
women often cared for livestock, in many rural households the males were more 
knowledgeable about the market price of the animals and their products. Information on 
children, including male children under 15, was moved to the female questionnaire. 
Substantial revisions to the actual content of the questionnaire were made only to the 
most sensitive components of the questionnaire: finances and empowerment.  
 
ii.  Implementation 
 
The final survey was implemented over an eight week period between late May and 
early July 2005. This period was selected as it was the most practical time to implement 
in agricultural areas (after the rabi agricultural season harvest), did not conflict with any 
major holidays, and was a time when there would be many new villages and clients just 
getting access to Khushhali Bank services for the first time, making it easier to collect 
data on a suitable control group.  
 
The survey was carried out by an independent multinational survey company with offices 
in Pakistan. Teams of two male and two female surveyors, headed by a supervisor with 
three to seven years of experience, were constructed for each district, making eight 
teams of five people. Male surveys were conducted by male surveyors and female 
                                                 
21 The participatory poverty assessment included locally defined characteristics of the poor and very poor, 
compiled from well being analysis. 
22 The author thanks Ms. Farzana Nuzhat and Mr. Asim Anwar of Khushhali Bank for facilitating the focus 
group discussions with clients.   12
surveys by female surveyors. Surveyors and supervisors for each team were recruited 
from local areas and interviews were conducted in local languages. Since many of the 
surveyors were new, one week of classroom training on survey administration, and field 
testing of the surveyors’ skill in both rural and urban areas were conducted. Extra 
surveyors were trained in the event that a surveyor might have to be replaced during the 
training, field testing, or once the survey was underway, but that was not necessary.  
 
iii.  Quality Control 
 
Survey teams spent three to four days in each village included in the survey to allow 
time for the team supervisor to edit all completed questionnaires and back check 15% of 
the fieldwork. If any problems were discovered during back checking, then 100% of that 
individual surveyors work was checked. An independent quality control department 
similarly carried out back checking of each supervisor’s work. Data processing could not 
be conducted on site due to cost considerations, and was instead done on edited 
questionnaires in a centralized location. A data program was designed to automatically 
check the consistency of answers, and in addition, 10% of the data entry and coding was 
randomly back checked.  
 
VI.   Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
A.  Empirical Methodology 
 
The difficulties involved in controlling for bias as described in section III are well 
explained mathematically in Coleman (1999), which points out that the a typical impact 
evaluation would want to estimate the following system of equations: 
 
ij B j B ij ij V X B ε β α + + =                 (1) 
ij Y ij Y j Y ij ij B V X Y   δ β α + + + =               (2) 
 
where Bij is the amount borrowed from the microfinance institution, Xij is a vector of 
household characteristics, Vj is a vector of village characteristics, Yij is an outcome on 
which we want to measure impact, αB, βB, αY, βY  and δY are parameters to be estimated 
and εij and  ij are errors representing unmeasured household and village characteristics 
that determine borrowing and outcomes, respectively. δY is the primary parameter of 
interest as it measures the impact of credit on the outcome  
 
The biases described in section III mean that the error terms of these two equations, εij 
and  ij , are likely to be correlated. This is because, for example, unobserved individual 
characteristics that cannot be controlled for in Xij might simultaneously influence both the 
amount borrowed Bij and the outcome variable Yij. A commonly used example of such an 
unobservable would be “entrepreneurship,” which is difficult to measure but likely to 
affect both variables. Or unobservable program placement variables, which cannot be 
controlled for in Vj, might influence both the amount borrowed Bij and the outcome 
variable Yij. Many factors that influence program placement can be measured, but an 
example of an unobservable factor would be “village leadership” or “ability to work 
together,” which influences how quickly and well villagers are able to organize into 
groups to take loans. Both of these factors are likely to affect both borrowing and the 
outcome variable. When the error terms are correlated, the estimation of the above   13
system yields biased parameter estimates, including our parameter of interest, δY, which 
measures the impact of borrowing.  
 
However, using the approach of surveying prospective clients who have not yet 
accessed loans as a control group, we can estimate the impact with a single equation: 
 
ij ij ij j ij ij T M V X Y ε β β β β + + + + = 4 3 2 1             (3) 
 
where Yij, is again a vector of outcome variables (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of 
variables and summary statistics for each) Xij is again a vector of household 
characteristics (see Appendix 2), Vj represents village fixed effects, which control for 
observable and unobservable variables that may influence program placement, defined 
as above, Mij is a membership dummy variable equal to 1 for any household that 
participates in the program, and Tij is a measure of treatment: that is access to or 
participation in the microfinance program (see Appendix 3).  
 
The treatment measures include two measures of access to microfinancial services: (1) 
“Accessed Loans,” a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has already accessed 
loans. This excludes the control group of new clients who have not yet accessed loans; 
and (2) “Months Microcredit Available,” a count of the number of months the 
microfinancial services have been available in a given village. For the new clients who 
have not yet accessed loans and for non participants, this treatment measure is equal to 
0. In addition to these two measures of access, there are three other measures of actual 
participation: (3) “Months Since First Borrowed,” the number of months elapsed since 
the household first borrowed; (4) “Total Amount of Loans,” the total amount ever 
borrowed by the household; and (5) “Number of Loans,” a count of the number of loan 
cycles the household has borrowed. The first two measures of treatment, which only 
measure the impacts of access to microfinance, are the strictest and most unbiased test 
of impact of the program.   
 
The hypothesis tested is whether access to and/or participation in the microfinance 
program of Khushhali Bank has a positive effect on various outcome measures. Support 
for the hypothesis requires that the estimated coefficient β4 on one of the treatment 
variables in (3) be statistically significantly positive. A statistically significantly positive 
coefficient estimate on one of the first two treatment variables indicates that simple 
access to the program has impact, regardless of the degree of participation. A 
statistically significantly positive coefficient estimate on one of the last three treatment 
variables indicates that the degree of actual participation in the program – the length of 
time the client has participated, how many loans he or she has taken and the total value 
of those loans – has an impact.  
 
In addition to the overall impacts of access to and participation in the microfinance 
program, differential impacts from various lending methodologies are examined: lending 
in urban areas as opposed to rural areas, lending to women as opposed to men, or 
lending to groups formed by NGO service provider partners vs. Khushhali Bank staff. 
The specification for these regressions is as follows: 
 
ij ij ij ij ij ij j ij ij T D T D M V X Y ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1         (4) 
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where Yij, Xij, Vj  Mij and Tij are defined as above and Dij is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 in the following cases: 
DijU =1 if urban 
DijF =1 if female 
DijSP =1 if service provider formed group 
 
The hypothesis tested is whether access to and participation in the microfinance 
program of Khushhali Bank using one of these particular lending methodologies has a 
more positive effect on various outcome measures than does the program overall. 
Support for the hypothesis requires that the estimated coefficient β6 in equation (4), the 
interaction of the treatment variables with a dummy variable indicating one of these 
lending methodologies, be statistically significantly positive. A finding of no special 
impact from these alternative lending methodologies does not mean that they do not 
have impact, but rather that their impact does not differ from the average impacts of the 
program overall.  
 
Finally, the impact of the program to particularly poor households – those in the bottom 
quintile of the sample, which corresponds to households at less than half the official 
caloric based poverty line – is examined. The specification for those regressions, 
equation (5), is similarly:  
 
ij ij ij ij ij ij j ij ij T P T P M V X Y ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1         (5) 
 
where Yij, Xij, Vj  Mij and Tij are defined as above and Pij is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for the very poorest households.  
 
The hypothesis tested is whether access to and participation in the microfinance 
program of Khushhali Bank has a more positive effect on various outcome measures for 
the very poorest households than it does on other borrowers. Support for the hypothesis 
requires that the estimated coefficient β6 in equation (5) – the interaction of the treatment 
variables with a dummy variable indicating these very poor households – be statistically 
significantly positive. A finding of no special impact on these households does not mean 
that the program has no impact on the poorest borrowers, but rather that their impact 
does not differ from the average impacts of the program overall.  
 
For most of the empirical analysis, ordinary least squares analysis (OLS) was applied. 
For regressions in which the outcome variable of interest was a yes/no dummy variable 
on qualitative information, logit estimation techniques were used.  
 
 
B.  Empirical Results 
 
1.  Impacts of the Program Overall 
 
Figures 4 11 present the results of the estimation of equations (3) and (4) on the entire 
data sample. Since there are many variables included in the regression to control for 
individual or village characteristics, the figures report only the main variables of interest: 
the coefficient estimates on the five variables indicating access to or participation in the 
microfinance program offered by Khushhali Bank. Each coefficient estimate represents a 
separate regression – dependent variables are reported as column headers and the   15
independent variables of interest in the five rows. Note that the independent variables 
indicating access or participation were included in five separate regressions, but they are 
reported in one row in the figures for economy of space. 
 
a)  Poverty Indicators – Consumption/Expenditure 
 
<Insert Figure 4 Around Here> 
 
The first set of regressions reported in appendix Figure 4 look at conventional monetary 
indicators of poverty. The first outcome variable, monthly consumption per capita, looks 
at the impact of the program on caloric consumption as measured by consumption 
expenditure on food items. The items used in calculating this variable correspond as 
closely as possible to the items used by the government of Pakistan in calculating the 
official poverty line. The other items included are monthly per capita consumption of non 
food items, monthly per capita expenditures on health care and annual educational 
expenditure per child in the household.  
 
The parameters indicate that the program does not impact most consumption 
expenditure measures – almost all coefficient estimates in Figure 4 are insignificantly 
different from 0. However, there is evidence that access to the program has a positive 
impact on health expenditures, as indicated by the statistically significant positive 
coefficient estimate in column 3. Clients who have already accessed loans more than 
one year earlier tend to have higher monthly per capital expenditures on health care. 
Since the bank’s program does nothing explicit to encourage health awareness per se, 
these results most likely indicate that poor households prefer or need to use the extra 
income generated by the enterprises financed by microcredit on health care rather than 
on education or food consumption. 
 
b)  Poverty Indicators – Social Indicators 
 
The next set of regressions look at social indicators of poverty, including again education 
and health, and also empowerment of women. The results of these regressions are 
reported in Figures 5 8.  
 
<Insert Figure 5 Around Here> 
 
As was found using the monetary indicators above, statistical analysis yields little 
evidence of positive impact of the program overall on education: the probability of 
children in client households being enrolled school is no higher than for non participating 
households and absentee rates are no lower. In fact, there is some evidence that both 
educational expenditures per child and the probability of the children being enrolled in 
school may be lower for client households than for non participants, as indicated by the 
statistically significant negative coefficients reported in Figure 5. One might speculate 
that households participating in the program may be more likely to include children in the 
household’s income generating activities, perhaps leading indirectly to a reduction in 
school enrollment, but this would require further research.  
 
For health care as well, the analysis of social indicators confirms the findings for 
monetary indicators above. Both access and participation have a strong positive impact 
on the probability of getting treatment for illnesses, and the likelihood that treatment is   16
from a trained professional. These results are particularly strong in the case of children’s 
illnesses: columns 6 and 7 of Figure 5 have highly statistically significant positive 
coefficient estimates on indicators of both access to and participation in the program. 
Participants who had taken more loan cycles were also more likely to be able to pay for 
their medical care from household assets or savings, as indicated in column 5.  
 
<Insert Figure 6 Around Here> 
 
The impact of the program on indicators of women’s health is not as high as that on 
general or children’s illnesses, although participation in the program does lead to higher 
likelihood of tetanus vaccination during pregnancy. Lending to groups formed by NGO 
partners, however, does positively impact women’s health. Pregnant women in the 
households of borrowers in NGO formed groups were more likely to have consulted a 
trained medical professional during their pregnancy, as indicated by the statistically 
significantly positive coefficient estimates in column 2 of Figure 6. Since the microcredit 
program would not be expected to directly impact indicators of women’s health, these 
effects may come from exchanges of information when borrowers gather for their 
monthly group meetings, or from non financial services provided to the groups formed by 
NGO partners. 
 
<Insert Figures 7 & 8 Around Here> 
 
As indicated in Figures 7 and 8, the program has a strong positive impact on women’s 
empowerment, and these impacts are even higher when the borrower was a woman. In 
client households, women’s opinions are more likely to be taken into consideration on a 
range of issues including child rearing (children’s schooling, marriages and discipline) 
social issues such as the woman’s decision to work outside the home or her involvement 
in community and political activities, and household financial decisions such as whether 
to construct or repair the family home, the sale and purchase of livestock and decisions 
on whether to borrow money. Women in client households also reported less frequent 
arguments with male household members and more financial independence as indicated 
by their ability to get a small amount of cash in an emergency from their own assets. 
 
c)  Income Generating Activities 
 
Tables 9 11 report the impact of the program on income generating activities run by the 
household – animal raising, microenterprises and agricultural activities.  
 
<Insert Figure 9 Around Here> 
 
As indicated in figure 9, participation in the microfinance program leads to more inputs 
into animal raising. Households who had taken more loan cycles or borrowed more in 
total report more males and females in the household working on animal raising, and 
more inputs into and higher assets (value of livestock) of their animal raising activities. 
However, the results of these greater inputs do not yet show up as an impact on sales or 
profits – we find no statistically significant coefficient estimates on the treatment 
variables in columns 5 and 6. 
 
<Insert Figure 10 Around Here> 
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Table 10 reports the impact of the program on household microenterprises. The first 
variable examined was a dummy variable for whether or not the household operates a 
microenterprise. There was such a strong correlation with participation in the 
microfinance program and operation of a microenterprise that it was not possible to 
conduct meaningful statistical tests on the relationship between the two – participation in 
the program almost perfectly predicts the incidence of running a microenterprise. Among 
those households who both participate in the microfinance program and run 
microenterprises, those with greater participation in the program report more women in 
the household working on those microenterprises and more monthly inputs into their 
business. The impact of the program on household run microenterprises was especially 
positive in urban areas, where positive impacts were found not only on inputs such as 
the number of outside hires, but also on statistically significantly higher sales and profits. 
 
<Insert Figure 11 Around Here> 
 
The largest impacts on income generating activities are found in agriculture (see Figure 
11). Both access to and participation in the program have strong positive impacts on all 
variables tested – assets, inputs and sales. Households with longer access to the 
program, or who had participated more, reported higher assets in terms of amount of 
land cultivated, a higher value of farm equipment assets, higher inputs such as the 
number of male and female household members working on the household farm, as well 
as more hired workers, higher hours of tractor use and higher use of fertilizers and 
pesticides. It is difficult to measure agricultural profits directly, but the value of sales to 
third parties (crop yields not consumed by the household itself) serves as a proxy. This 
variable as well shows a highly statistically significant impact from program participation, 
as indicated by the highly statistically significant coefficient estimates in row 10 of Figure 
11.  
 
2.  Impacts on the Poorest of the Poor 
 
Figures 12 14 present the results of the estimation of equation (5), which looks at the 
impact of the program on the very poorest borrowers who were in the bottom quintile of 
the sample as measured by monthly caloric intake per capita. This group corresponds to 
households consuming less than one half the official calorie based poverty line. 
 
 
a)  Poverty Indicators – Consumption/Expenditure 
 
<Insert Figure 12 Around Here> 
 
Figure 12 reports the regression results on monetary indicators of poverty. As would be 
expected, the poorest of the poor have lower overall levels of not only monthly food 
consumption per capita, but also non food expenditures and educational expenditures, 
as indicated by the statistically significantly negative coefficient estimates on the dummy 
variable for the core poor group. Looking at the coefficient estimates on the treatment 
variables, we again find the program does not impact most consumption expenditure 
measures – almost all coefficient estimates in Table 4 are insignificantly different from 0. 
There is, however, evidence that participation in the program has a positive impact on 
educational expenditures for the very poor, as indicated by the statistically significant   18
positive coefficient estimate in column 4. The more loan cycles that very poor clients 
have taken, the higher the household’s annual educational expenditures per child.  
 
b)  Poverty Indicators – Social Indicators 
 
The next set of regressions, reported in Figure 13, look at the impacts for the poorest of 
the poor on social indicators of poverty: non monetary indicators of education and health.  
 
<Insert Figure 13 Around Here> 
 
Again, the program is found to have special impacts on children’s education for the 
poorest borrowers. The previous finding that the probability of the children being enrolled 
in school may be lower for client households than for non participants is reversed for the 
very poorest borrowers. Although children in the poorest households are less likely to be 
enrolled in school overall, for those core poor who participate in the microfinance 
program, the longer they have participated in the program, the more likely children in the 
household are to be enrolled in school.  
 
Children in the poorest households also reap health benefits. As reported above, the 
program positively impacts indicators of children’s health for all borrowers, but the 
poorest borrowers also benefit from higher likelihood of vaccination, as indicated by the 
statistically significantly positive coefficient in column 6 of Figure 13. Thus, although 
children in the poorest households are less likely to be vaccinated overall, the likelihood 
of children receiving vaccinations increases the longer those households have access to 
or participate in the microfinance program.  
 
c)  Income Generating Activities 
 
Figure 14 reports the impact of the program on income generating activities run by the 
poorest households: animal raising, microenterprises and agricultural activities.  
 
<Insert Figure 14 Around Here> 
 
Confirming the findings above, participation in the microfinance program has the biggest 
impacts on rural agricultural activities. There is no evidence of higher sales and profits 
for households engaged in animal raising or microenterprises, but strong positive 
impacts are found for sales of agricultural products, and those impacts are even larger 
for the poorest clients. . 
 
VII.   Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis here demonstrates that access to and participation in Khushhali 
Bank’s microcredit program has positive impacts on both monetary and social indicators 
of welfare, as well as on employment and income generating activities.  
 
The microloans are apparently not being used for consumption purposes, as no impact 
is found on either food or non food non durable consumption. But there is evidence that 
the program enables the poor households that it serves to increase expenditure on 
health care, making those households more likely to seek medical treatment for their 
health problems and more likely to seek trained professionals to provide that treatment. 
These impacts are especially strong in the case of children’s illnesses. Women in   19
households of borrowers in NGO formed groups were also more likely to seek medical 
consultations and to receive vaccinations during their pregnancies. 
 
The program also increases the empowerment of women – the degree to which 
women’s decisions are taken into account in areas such as child rearing, participation in 
community or political activities, and financial matters. The impact is especially strong on 
measures of social and financial empowerment, such as the ability of women to get 
small amounts of cash when necessary from their own assets. The impact of the 
program on empowerment is even stronger when the borrower in the household is a 
female client.  
 
The highest aggregate impacts of the program on income generating activities are to 
agriculture, where almost all outcome variables – assets, inputs and sales – were higher 
for those who had more access to or participation in the program. In addition, 
employment is generated in all sectors either by enabling the start up of household 
enterprises, household members’ ability to provide more of their labor hours to those 
enterprises, or more hiring of labor from outside the family. Urban lending in particular 
yields significant positive impact on income generation from family run microenterprises: 
those borrowers demonstrate significantly higher sales and profits from their 
microenterprises than do non participants. 
 
Most encouraging is the finding that even the very poorest of the poor – those subsisting 
on less than half the official poverty line, or the bottom quintile of the sample – benefit 
greatly from the program. The poorest borrowers benefit from increased educational 
expenditures and higher likelihood of enrollment in school for their children, higher 
likelihood of vaccination against childhood illnesses and even higher sales of agricultural 
products compared to other borrowers.  
 
These findings hold promise for the millions of poor households in Pakistan. If Khushhali 
Bank is able to maintain its current path toward full financial self sufficiency, client 
households will continue to have access to microfinancial services and receive these 
benefits into the foreseeable future, regardless of the whims of donors and limits on the 
resources they can provide. 
 
Hopefully, the benefits of this program will spread beyond Pakistan. The case of 
Khushhali Bank shows that given a supportive regulatory environment, it is possible for 
commercial microfinance banks to meet a “double bottom line” of simultaneously 
pursuing profits and a humanitarian social mission. Perhaps other countries can follow 
the example of Pakistan in promoting the development of a sustainable microfinance 
sector that improves the welfare of the poor.    20
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Outreach Indicators for MF Providers in Pakistan 
  OUTREACH INDICATORS 













A. Financial Institutions 
(offering microfinance as 
separate product) 
   1.  The BOK 
2.  Orix Leasing 




  9,056 





















B. Specialized MFIs 
1.  Kashf 
2.  ASASAH 
Subtotal 
 
  67,552 















C. Rural Support Program 
1.  NRSP 
2.  PRSP 
3.  SRSP 
4.  TRDP 




  5,077 





     313 
  5,773 
45,935 
 
   829,407,585 
   351,372,123 
     29,286,303 










1.  DAMEN 
2.  SUNGI 
3.  SAFWCO 
4.  Taraqee 
5.  OPP 
Subtotal 
 
  6,980 
  1,108 
  3,569 
18,194 
  3,895 
33,746 
 
  6,980 
       42 
  1,761 
13,526 

















Grand Total (A+B+C+D)  273,676  142,628  2,344,056,539  52.12 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network “Performance Indicators Report 2004” 



























Figure 4: Indicators of Poverty: Consumption-Expenditure
1 2 3 4

















Accessed Loans 52.14  25.2 40.7  4.8
[37.63] [94.96] [20.20]** [59.69]
Months Microcredit Available 0.2  2.9 0.66 0.25
[0.83] [2.10] [0.45] [1.32]
Months since First Borrowed 0.78  0.41 0.74 0.89
[0.91] [2.28] [0.49] [1.44]
Total Amount of Loans 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of Loan Cycles  1.61  18.57 5.72  35.27
[13.62] [34.36] [7.31] [21.65]
Observations 2859 2859 2859 2881
R squared 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.19
F statistics 39.13 5.86 1.49 22.95
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Province  Freq.      Percent         Cum.
Punjab  802 27.8 27.8
Sindh  976 33.9 61.7
NWFP 495 17.2 78.9
Baluchistan 345 12.0 90.9
AJ Kashmir 263 9.1 100.0
Total  2,881 100.0
Figure 2: Sample Distribution by Province











Figure 3: Sample Distribution by District
District
Urban (Quetta, Karachi, Lahore, part of Kohat)
Rahimyar Khan  
Dera Ghazi Khan 





Dera Ismali Khan 
Kohat    24
Figure 5: Social Indicators of Poverty: Education and Health
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8










































Accessed Loans  0.21  1.06  0.01 0.00  0.15 0.45 0.45 0.14
[0.18] [1.71] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.19]** [0.19]** [0.20]
Odds Ratio 0.81 1.07 1.06 0.94 1.47 1.44 0.98
Months Microcredit Available  0.01  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.00]* [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]
Odds Ratio 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99
Months since First Borrowed  0.01  0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.00]** [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]
Odds Ratio 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00
Total Amount of Loans  0.20  0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.06]*** [0.62] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]*** [0.00]** [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.04
[0.00]** [0.00] [0.07]** [0.06]* [0.06]** [0.07]*** [0.07]** [0.08]
Odds Ratio 0.82 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.23 1.18 1.00
Observations 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881
R squared
1 0.26 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.28 0.26 0.40
F statistics
2 1025.08 7.96 300.25 214.90 238.96 1044.25 977.82 1613.10
Standard errors in brackets
1/ Pseudo R squared for logit regressions
2/ Chi  square statistics for logit regressions
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Figure 6: Social Indicators of Poverty: Women's Health: Differential Effects from Lending to NGO Groups
1 2 3 4 5



























Accessed Loans 0.19  0.03 0.32  0.11  0.14
[0.18] [0.18] [0.20] [0.18] [0.17]
Odds Ratio 1.21 0.97 1.38 0.89 0.87
NGO*Accessed Loans -0.07 0.54 0.56 -0.22 0.10
[0.26] [0.26]** [0.26]** [0.29] [0.26]
Odds Ratio 0.93 1.71 1.76 0.80 1.10
Months Microcredit Available 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00]** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
NGO*Months Microcredit Available 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.01
Months since First Borrowed 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00
NGO*Months since First Borrowed 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01
[0.02] [0.01]** [0.01]*** [0.02] [0.02]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.03 1.04 0.99 1.01
Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NGO*Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]* [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles 0.08 0.07 0.18  0.03 0.07
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07]*** [0.07] [0.06]
Odds Ratio 1.09 1.08 1.19 0.97 1.07
NGO*Number of Loan Cycles -0.21 0.22 0.41 0.05 0.04
[0.18] [0.18] [0.18]** [0.19] [0.18]
Odds Ratio 0.81 1.25 1.50 1.05 1.05
Observations 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881
Pseudo R squared 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.22
Chi2 statistics 907.97 770.37 628.93 447.84 862.56
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Figure 7: Social Indicators of Poverty: Women's Empowerment: Childrearing, Arguments
Woman's opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

















Female Khushhali Bank Client (0/1) 0.22 0.45 0.33 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 0.52
[0.30] [0.34] [0.29] [0.29] [0.51] [0.48] [0.62]
Odds Ratio 1.25 1.57 1.39 1.19 0.99 0.99 1.69
Accessed Loans 0.49 0.64 0.17 0.05 0.62 0.46  0.46
[0.20]** [0.24]*** [0.20] [0.20] [0.33]* [0.32] [0.49]
Odds Ratio 1.63 1.90 1.19 1.05 1.86 1.59 0.63
Female*Accessed Loans 0.13 -0.18 0.19 0.41 0.40 0.28 -1.42
[0.33] [0.36] [0.32] [0.31] [0.53] [0.51] [0.76]*
Odds Ratio 1.14 0.83 1.21 1.50 1.49 1.32 0.24
Months Microcredit Available 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.01
[0.00]*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
Female*Months Microcredit Available 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]* [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.02]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 0.98
Months since First Borrowed 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.02
[0.00]* [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98
Female*Months since First Borrowed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]* [0.01]** [0.02]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02 0.99
Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Female*Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles 0.12 0.04 0.01  0.11 0.14 0.11  0.67
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09] [0.39]*
Odds Ratio 1.12 1.05 1.01 0.90 1.14 1.11 0.51
Female*Number of Loan Cycles -0.05 0.13 0.15 0.19 -0.13 -0.09 0.55
[0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11]* [0.15] [0.15] [0.53]
Odds Ratio 0.95 1.14 1.16 1.21 0.88 0.92 1.73
Observations 2881.0 2881.0 2881.0 2881.0 2881.0 2881.0 2881.0
Pseudo R squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
Chi2 statistics 241.7 166.1 205.2 218.0 149.8 162.1 46.9
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Figure 8: Social Indicators of Poverty: Women's Empowerment: Social Empowerment, Financial Empowerment
Woman's opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

























Female Khushhali Bank Client (0/1) -1.16 -0.60 0.19 0.09 -0.08 0.36 -0.12 0.96
[1.08] [0.60] [0.29] [0.30] [0.29] [0.40] [0.57] [0.38]**
Odds Ratio 0.31 0.55 1.21 1.10 0.92 1.43 0.88 2.62
Accessed Loans 0.19 0.25 0.43 0.48 0.30 0.62 0.84 0.67
[0.42] [0.33] [0.20]** [0.20]** [0.19] [0.28]** [0.32]*** [0.28]**
Odds Ratio 1.21 1.29 1.54 1.62 1.35 1.85 2.31 1.95
Female*Accessed Loans 1.94 1.25 -0.01 0.06 0.31 0.05 0.80 -0.07
[1.10]* [0.63]** [0.32] [0.32] [0.32] [0.43] [0.59] [0.40]
Odds Ratio 6.96 3.47 0.99 1.06 1.36 1.05 2.22 0.93
Months Microcredit Available 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]** [0.01]**
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Female*Months Microcredit Available 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.01]* [0.01]** [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Odds Ratio 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
Months since First Borrowed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.01]* [0.01]** [0.01]*
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Female*Months since First Borrowed 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
[0.01] [0.01]* [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Odds Ratio 1.02 1.02 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]* [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]** [0.00]*** [0.00]**
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Female*Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.17
[0.11] [0.10] [0.07]* [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]* [0.08]*** [0.07]**
Odds Ratio 1.20 1.04 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.15 1.23 1.18
Female*Number of Loan Cycles 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -0.13
[0.17] [0.16] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
Odds Ratio 1.03 0.96 1.02 1.08 1.06 0.89 0.98 0.88
Observations 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881
Pseudo R squared 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.09
Chi2 statistics 141.2 107.1 140.0 169.0 175.2 147.1 329.5 293.7
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Figure 9: Income Generating Activities: Animal Raising
1 2 3 4 5 6
























Accessed Loans -5,837.54 1,258.87 0.07 0.07 39,248.24 37,989.37
[4,891.05] [1,227.46] [0.06] [0.06] [52,020.57] [51,904.88]
Months Microcredit Available -123 16.11 0 0 989.24 973.13
[108.13] [27.14] [0.00] [0.00] [1,149.98] [1,147.42]
Months since First Borrowed 4.19 34.49 0 0 864.1 829.61
[117.75] [29.54] [0.00] [0.00]* [1,252.07] [1,249.29]
Total Amount of Loans 0.36 0.08 0 0 0.15 0.07
[0.13]*** [0.03]*** [0.00]** [0.00]* [1.33] [1.33]
Number of Loan Cycles 6,477.59 1,282.62 0.07 0.06 -1,005.03 -2,287.65
[1,771.58]*** [444.96]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [18,883.56] [18,841.41]
Observations 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881
R squared 0.19 0.1 0.33 0.42 0.02 0.02
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Figure 10: Income Generating Activities: Microenterprise
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8





















Accessed Loans  10,346.66  4,897.95  0.07  0.12 0.29  0.06  9,926.26  2,104.70
[5,865.75]* [25,294.12] [0.05] [0.03]*** [0.44] [0.05] [8,110.92] [3,353.22]
Odds Ratio 1.33
Urban*Accessed Loans 5,380.41 -8,193.88 0.14 0.01 0.17 0.10 49,282.35 14,862.33
[6,647.84] [28,666.61] [0.06]** [0.04] [0.45] [0.06]* [9,192.36]*** [3,800.31]***
1.18
Months Microcredit Available  65.41 1,282.95 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  78.97  33.85
[133.46] [574.70]** [0.00] [0.00]** [0.01] [0.00] [184.49] [76.25]
Odds Ratio 1.01
Urban*Months Microcredit Available64.51 -849.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,148.93 365.63
[166.50] [717.00] [0.00]** [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [230.18]*** [95.13]***
Odds Ratio 1.00
Months since First Borrowed  167.18 1,140.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  481.96  110.18
[138.37] [596.20]* [0.00]** [0.00]*** [0.01] [0.00] [191.68]** [79.21]
Odds Ratio 1.00
Urban*Months since First Borrowed-178.04 -1,142.90 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1,327.66 366.73
[244.88] [1,055.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [339.22]*** [140.17]***
Odds Ratio 0.99
Total Amount of Loans  0.04  0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04  0.04
[0.14] [0.62] [0.00] [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.20] [0.08]
Odds Ratio 1.00
Urban*Total Amount of Loans 0.41 -0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.83 0.89
[0.51] [2.19] [0.00]** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]* [0.70]*** [0.29]***
Odds Ratio 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles  425.20  9,141.46 0.00 0.02  0.14  0.03 655.22  1,018.53
[2,046.02] [8,817.81] [0.02] [0.01]* [0.20] [0.02] [2,832.71] [1,170.37]
Odds Ratio 0.87
Urban*Number of Loan Cycles 4,797.24 -5,039.13 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.09 32,141.94 8,804.87
[5,270.97] [22,716.55] [0.04]** [0.03]** [0.35] [0.05]* [7,297.67]*** [3,015.13]***
Odds Ratio 1.29
Observations 2,881.00 2,881.00 2,881.00 2,881.00 2,881.00 2,881.00 2,881.00 2,881.00
R squared
1 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.08
F statistics
2 6.12 1.80 12.20 7.84 99.37 2.37 9.20 8.71
Standard errors in brackets
1/ Pseudo R squared for logit regressions
2/ Chi  square statistics for logit regressions
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Figure 11: Income Generating Activities: Agriculture
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






































Accessed Loans 0.75 5650.04 0.82  0.27 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.86 0.05 14929.48
[2.91] [4,532.97] [3.02] [0.18] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.62] [0.03] [5,237.91]***
Odds Ratio 0.76 2.36
Months Microcredit Available 0.17  30.65 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 69.74
[0.06]*** [100.24] [0.07]* [0.00] [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]** [0.00]* [117.54]
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.02
Months since First Borrowed 0.25 151.15 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 275.97
[0.07]*** [109.09] [0.07]*** [0.00]* [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.01]** [0.00]*** [127.87]**
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.02
Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73
[0.00]*** [0.12]* [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.14]***
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles 7.57 4921.70 7.20 0.51 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.03 11361.32
[1.05]*** [1,643.18]*** [1.09]*** [0.07]*** [0.03]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.12]* [0.01]** [1,918.13]***
Odds Ratio 1.66 1.24
Observations 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881
R squared
1 0.1 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.17 0.3 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.11
F statistics
2 11.76 7.43 12.67 729.58 21.47 46.31 32.29 125.02 2.65 12.67
Notes: Standard errors in brackets
Odds ratio for logit estimation is reported below standard error
1/ Pseudo R squared for logit regressions
2/ Chi  square statistics for logit regressions
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    27
 
Figure 12: Indicators of Poverty: Consumption-Expenditure: Impacts on the Core Poor
1 2 3 4
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly
Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per
Capita - Food Capita - Food Capita - Food Capita - Food
Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly
Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per
Capita - Non- Capita - Non- Capita - Non- Capita - Non-
Food Food Food Food
Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly
Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per
Capita - Health Capita - Health Capita - Health Capita - Health
Care Care Care Care
Annual Annual Annual Annual
Expenditure on Expenditure on Expenditure on Expenditure on
Education per Education per Education per Education per
child child child child
Khushhaili Bank Client (0/1) -25.05 97.55 -48.7 45.68
[34.27] [93.33] [19.90]** [58.73]
Core Poor Core Poor Core Poor Core Poor -491.44 -491.44 -491.44 -491.44 -198.42 -198.42 -198.42 -198.42 6.45 6.45 6.45 6.45 -153.24 -153.24 -153.24 -153.24
[29.08]*** [29.08]*** [29.08]*** [29.08]*** [79.19]** [79.19]** [79.19]** [79.19]** [16.89] [16.89] [16.89] [16.89] [50.03]*** [50.03]*** [50.03]*** [50.03]***
Accessed Loans 48.79 -8.48 38.89 -34.39
[36.13] [98.38] [20.98]* [61.86]
Core Poor*Accessed Loans Core Poor*Accessed Loans Core Poor*Accessed Loans Core Poor*Accessed Loans -16.71 -16.71 -16.71 -16.71 -90.23 -90.23 -90.23 -90.23 8.78 8.78 8.78 8.78 127.98 127.98 127.98 127.98
[43.73] [43.73] [43.73] [43.73] [119.07] [119.07] [119.07] [119.07] [25.39] [25.39] [25.39] [25.39] [75.18]* [75.18]* [75.18]* [75.18]*
Months Microcredit Available 0.48 -2.59 0.61 -0.48
[0.82] [2.24] [0.48] [1.41]
Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 3 3 3 3
[1.11] [1.11] [1.11] [1.11] [3.01] [3.01] [3.01] [3.01] [0.64] [0.64] [0.64] [0.64] [1.90] [1.90] [1.90] [1.90]
Months since First Borrowed 1.67 0.21 0.58 0.08
[0.92]* [2.51] [0.53] [1.58]
Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 3.23 3.23 3.23 3.23
[1.31] [1.31] [1.31] [1.31] [3.57] [3.57] [3.57] [3.57] [0.76] [0.76] [0.76] [0.76] [2.26] [2.26] [2.26] [2.26]
Total Amount of Loans 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]*
Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]* [0.00]* [0.00]* [0.00]*
Number of Loan Cycles 19.45 -3.87 3.51 -60.79
[15.06] [41.01] [8.75] [25.85]**
Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles -5.51 -5.51 -5.51 -5.51 -13.32 -13.32 -13.32 -13.32 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 64.77 64.77 64.77 64.77
[18.24] [18.24] [18.24] [18.24] [49.67] [49.67] [49.67] [49.67] [10.60] [10.60] [10.60] [10.60] [31.35]** [31.35]** [31.35]** [31.35]**
Constant 1,197.83 1,055.61 112.29 215.59
[36.13]*** [98.38]*** [20.98]*** [61.59]***
Observations 2859 2859 2859 2881
R-squared 0.29 0.06 0.02 0.19
F statistics 39.13 5.86 1.49 22.95
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Figure 13: Social Indicators of Poverty: Education and Health: Impacts on the Core Poor
1 2 4 5 6 7
Logit OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit
Education: Education: Education: Education:
Probability Probability Probability Probability
Children Children Children Children
Enrolled in Enrolled in Enrolled in Enrolled in
School School School School
Education: Education: Education: Education:
Days Children Days Children Days Children Days Children
Absent from Absent from Absent from Absent from
School School School School
Health: Health: Health: Health:
Probability Probability Probability Probability
seek medical seek medical seek medical seek medical
treatment if treatment if treatment if treatment if
child ill child ill child ill child ill
Health: Health: Health: Health:
Probability Probability Probability Probability
medical medical medical medical
treatment from treatment from treatment from treatment from
trained trained trained trained
professional if professional if professional if professional if
child ill child ill child ill child ill
Probability take Probability take Probability take Probability take
ORS to treat ORS to treat ORS to treat ORS to treat
diarrhea diarrhea diarrhea diarrhea
Probability Probability Probability Probability
children children children children
vaccinated vaccinated vaccinated vaccinated
Khushhaili Bank Client (0/1) 0.41 1.66 -0.24 -0.21 0.16 -0.02
[0.18]** [1.68] [0.18] [0.18] [0.24] [0.20]
Odds Ratio 1.50 0.79 0.81 1.17 0.98
Core Poor Core Poor Core Poor Core Poor -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45
[0.15]*** [0.15]*** [0.15]*** [0.15]*** [1.43] [1.43] [1.43] [1.43] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.20] [0.20] [0.20] [0.20] [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.18]**
Odds Ratio 0.57 0.94 0.78 0.91 0.64
Accessed Loans -0.33 -0.71 0.39 0.36 -0.09 -0.02
[0.19]* [1.77] [0.19]** [0.19]* [0.26] [0.21]
Odds Ratio 0.72 1.47 1.44 0.92 0.98
Core Poor*Accessed Loans Core Poor*Accessed Loans Core Poor*Accessed Loans Core Poor*Accessed Loans 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 -1.50 -1.50 -1.50 -1.50 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
[0.23]** [0.23]** [0.23]** [0.23]** [2.15] [2.15] [2.15] [2.15] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.29]** [0.29]** [0.29]** [0.29]** [0.26]*** [0.26]*** [0.26]*** [0.26]***
Odds Ratio 1.74 1.32 1.42 1.81 2.18
Months Microcredit Available -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01
[0.00]** [0.04] [0.00]* [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99
Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***
Odds Ratio 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02
Months since First Borrowed -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
[0.00]*** [0.05] [0.00]** [0.00]* [0.01] [0.01]
Odds Ratio 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***
Odds Ratio 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02
Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00]** [0.00] [0.00]*** [0.00]** [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Odds Ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Loan Cycles -0.25 -0.49 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.00
[0.08]*** [0.74] [0.08]*** [0.08]** [0.09] [0.09]
Odds Ratio 0.78 1.23 1.18 1.08 1.00
Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.90] [0.90] [0.90] [0.90] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
Odds Ratio 1.15 0.98 0.96 1.01 1.16
Constant -1.76 -5.62 -1.84 -1.83 -3.06 -1.63
[0.20]*** [1.76]*** [0.20]*** [0.20]*** [0.27]*** [0.22]***
Observations 2881.00 2881.00 2881.00 2881.00 2881.00 2881.00
R squared
1 0.26 0.07 0.28 0.26 0.14 0.40
F statistics
2 1038.92 7.45 1044.25 977.82 269.13 1613.10
Notes: Standard errors in brackets
Odds ratio for logit estimation is reported below standard error
1/ Pseudo R squared for logit regressions
2/ Chi  square statistics for logit regressions
























Figure 14: Income Generating Activities: Animal Raising/Microenterprise/Agriculture: Impacts on the Core Poor
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Animal Raising - 
Sales of Livestock 
and Products







Sales to Third 
Parties
Khushhaili Bank Client (0/ 1)  12197.81  12881.22 11833.86 2082.19 15025.79
[51,251.39] [51,134.82] [7,597.51] [3,139.98] [5,236.77]***
Core Poor 67,671.51 71,414.62 -24,425.08 -7,952.08 -7,280.46
[43,654.67] [43,555.38] [6,471.37]*** [2,674.56]*** [4,460.55]
Accessed Loans 53644.93 52646.35 2522.01 1330.47  6708.45
[53,984.77] [53,861.98] [8,002.70] [3,307.44] [5,516.06]
Core Poor*Accessed Loans -62730.55 -63696.63 590.77 742.54 11806.8
[65,601.65] [65,452.43] [9,724.79] [4,019.16] [6,703.05]*
Months Microcredit Available 1441.05 1432.29 261.24 59.64  33.07
[1,229.58] [1,226.78] [182.20] [75.32] [125.60]
Core Poor*Months Microcredit Available -1806.44 -1841.24 59.5 63.52 397.19
[1,660.98] [1,657.20] [246.13] [101.75] [169.66]**
Months since First Borrowed 1702.31 1678.76  298.13  53.08 146.97
[1,376.07] [1,372.93] [203.96] [84.32] [140.48]
Core Poor*Months since First Borrowed -3072.86 -3125.56 37.83 -28.47 456.93
[1,968.57] [1,964.08] [291.77] [120.63] [200.97]**
Total Amount of Loans 0.85 0.77 0.12  0.05 0.51
[1.66] [1.66] [0.25] [0.10] [0.17]***
Core Poor*Total Amount of Loans -1.77 -1.79 -0.15 0.03 0.51
[2.19] [2.19] [0.32] [0.13] [0.22]**
Number of Loan Cycles 6178.04 4913.85 229.94  1643.76 8608.93
[22,574.97] [22,523.44] [3,346.01] [1,382.56] [2,291.27]***
Core Poor*Number of Loan Cycles -19444.87 -19778.69 -26.45 875.03 6435.11
[27,376.01] [27,313.52] [4,057.61] [1,676.59] [2,778.55]**
Constant  25,555.27  20,187.89 39,752.48 17,385.35  28,981.67
[53,748.54] [53,626.28] [7,967.68]*** [3,292.97]*** [5,491.92]***
Observations 2881 2881 2881 2881 2881
R squared 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.11
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%  29
Appendix 2. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Appendix 2A. Summary Statistics - Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Label           Obs  Mean  Std.Dev. Min  Max   
                                                                                                                     
Consumption Expenditure: 
Monthly consumption expenditure per capita: Food 2859  863  555   0  8990 
Monthly consumption expenditure per capita: Non Food 
    2859  772  1316  38  4969 
Monthly medical expenditure per capita     2859  96  274   0  8333 
 
Education: 
Probability children attending school    2881  0.44  0.44  0  1 
School expenses per child         2881   630  897  0  11900 
School expenses per girl        2881  172  377  0  7933 
Days children absent from school       2881  6.25  24  0  550   
 
Health: 
Spending on medical care         2881  6834  23841  0         900000 
Probability seek medical treatment if ill     2881  0.60  0.48  0  1   
Probability of medical treatment from trained practitioner if ill 
    2881   0.57  0.48  0  1   
Ability to pay for medical treatment from own sources: 
2881  0.52  0.49  0  1   
Probability seek medical treatment if child ill     2881  0.60  0.49  0  1 
Probability of medical treatment from trained practitioner if child ill 
    2881    0.58  0.49  0  1 
Probability children vaccinated      2881  0.44  0.47  0  1 
Probability consulted someone during pregnancy   
2881  0.35  047  0  1 
Probability consulted trained practitioner during pregnancy 
2881  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Probability of tetanus vaccine during pregnancy 
2881  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Probability child delivered in a medical facility 
2881   0.23  0.42  0  1 
Probability childbirth attended by trained professional 
2881  0.38  0.48  0  1 
 
Empowerment: 
Opinions taken into consideration “most of the time” or “always” regarding: 
Child’s schooling          2881   0.58  0.49  0  1 
Child’s marriage          2881   0.39  0.48  0  1   
Child’s medical care          2881   0.64  0.47  0  1  
Whether to have another child      2881   0.23  0.42  0  1 
Type of contraception to use       2881  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Woman’s participation in community/political activities 
    2881  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Woman’s decision to work outside home    2881  0.18  0.39  0  1   30
Social visits to woman’s family      2881  0.64  0.47  0  1 
Social visits to man’s family        2881  0.67  0.46  0  1 
Social visits to friends/neighbors      2881  0.69  0.46  0  1 
Repair/construction of house     2881   0.34  0.47  0  1 
Sale/purchase of livestock        2881  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Borrowing money          2881  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Can get 500 rupees by selling own assets     2881  0.01  0.13  0  1   
Probability ever argued with male hh member  2881  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Frequency of arguments: daily      2881  0.02  0.15  0  1   
Frequency of arguments: more than 2 3 times per week 
2881  0.04  0.21  0  1 
Incidence of domestic violence       2881  0.06  0.25  0  1   
 
Microenterprise: 
Have own microenterprise        2881  0.27  0.44  0  1   
Value of capital assets         2881  17180  78757  0       1002200 
Monthly inputs           2880  46855  190780 0    3384000 
Number males working HH microenterprise   2881  0.28  0.68  0  11   
Number of females working HH microenterprise   2881  0.09  0.41  0  5 
Probability hired labor (0/1)        2881   0.03  0.17  0  1 
Number of people hired        2881  0.08  0.71  0  15 
Sales              2881  37437  109191 0      1024000 
Profits Reported          2881  13540  45040  0        700000 
 
Livestock: 
Assets   value of livestock         2881  39256  73610  0       1158800 
Annual inputs for livestock        2881  6443  17555  0         513000 
Number males working HH livestock     2881    0.74  1.03  0  7 
Number of females working HH livestock     2881  0.88  1.12  0  8 
Production/sales of livestock and products    2878  67931  278339 0      5549600 
Profits reported from livestock      2878  61498  273627 –513000 5485000 
 
Agriculture: 
Assets land cultivated       2881  17.24  41.67  0  800 
Assets value of farm equipment      2881  10745  63604  0         939200 
Inputs hours of tractor use         2881  14.60  43.37  0  1006 
Inputs pesticide use (0/1)        2881    0.29  0.45  0  1 
Inputs amount of pesticide use      2881  0.60  1.11  0  16 
Number males working HH agriculture     2881  0.61  1.02  0  7   
Number of females working HH agriculture    2881    0.41  0.92  0  7   
Inputs probability hired labor (0/1)      2881  0.02  0.16  0  1 
Inputs number of hired labor        2881  0.06  0.42  0  7 
Value of sales to third parties       2881  24453  76306  0       1345000   31
Appendix 2B. Summary Statistics - Individual Household Characteristics 
 
 
Variable Label         Obs  Mean  Std.Dev. Min  Max   
                                                                                                                     
Education of highest educated male (years) 2881    5.76  5.09  0  20 
Literacy of male         2881    1.38  1.41  0   9   
Numeracy of male         2881    1.68  1.45  0  9   
Male age 16 21        2881    0.52  0.76  0  4   
Male age 22 29        2881    0.51  0.76  0  5   
Male age 30 39        2881    0.43  0.61  0  4   
Male age 40 49        2881    0.31  0.48  0  3   
Male age 50 59        2881    0.20  0.40  0  2   
Male age over 60        2881  0.19  0.40  0  2   
Total Number Males in HH      2881  2.18  1.38  0  11   
Education of highest educated female (years)2881  2.41  3.94  0  16   
Literacy of female         2881    0.64  1.04  0  8   
Numeracy of female         2881  0.82  1.15  0  8   
Female age 16 21        2881  0.51  0.75  0  5 
Female age 22 29        2881  0.47  0.68  0  4   
Female age 30 39        2881  0.43  0.57  0  3   
Female age 40 49        2881  0.30  0.47  0  3   
Female age 50 59        2881  0.15  0.36  0  2   
Female age over 60        2881  0.33  0.56  0  4   
Total Number Females in HH     2881  3.78  1.93  0  14.5   
Children age 0 4        2881    0.98  1.11  0  9   
Children age 5 9        2881    1.19  1.23  0   8   
Children age 10 15        2881    1.10  1.21  0   9   
Generations Family in Village     2881  1.70  1.40  0  3   
Number of relatives in village     2881    43.71  59.73  0   600   
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1)  “Accessed Loans”:  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has already 
accessed loans. This measure of access excludes the control group of new clients who 
have not yet accessed loans. 
 
2)  “Months Microcredit Available”: a count of the number of months the microfinancial 
services have been available in a given village. For new clients who have not yet 
accessed loans and for non participants, this treatment measure is equal to 0.  
 
Measuring participation: 
(3) “Months Since First Borrowed”:  the number of months elapsed since the household 
first borrowed  
 
(4) “Total Amount of Loans”:  the total amount ever borrowed by the household 
 
(5) “Number of Loan Cycles”:  a count of the number of loan cycles the household has 
borrowed. The first two measures of treatment, which only measure the impacts of 
access to microfinance, present the most unbiased results.  